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Abstract The paper compares conventional and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration from a wel-
fare perspective. By an existing contract, one party is supposed to make a payment
to another party; the amount of this payment is supposed to depend on the state of
the world. This state is, however, unknown. Two scenarios are considered. Under one
of them, one party may learn an argument in support of its case. This argument may
not be convincing to the other party. The ranking of the two arbitration procedures
then depends on the assumptions regarding the arbitrator. If the arbitrator’s ability
to recognize the validity of arguments is high, conventional arbitration dominates
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration in the following sense: the probability of ﬁling a request for
arbitration is no higher in any equilibrium of the former form of arbitration than in
any equilibrium of the latter form; and it is strictly lower for some pairs of equilibria.
If the arbitrator’s ability recognize the validity of arguments is low, ﬁnal-oﬀer arbi-
tration dominates conventional arbitration in a quite similar sense. The parameters
of the model determine which of the two procedures better approximates the existing
contractual arrangement. Under the second scenario, both parties believe that their
opponents have wrong signals about the state of the world. In that case, conventional
arbitration approximates the existing contractual arrangement better than ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration. The probability of ﬁling a request for arbitration is the same under both
procedures.
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11 Introduction
Arbitration by third-party neutrals has become an often-used method of conﬂict res-
olution. It is frequently prescribed to resolve labor-management disputes when the
labor unions are legally prohibited from striking, as in public services such as police
and ﬁre protection. The use of arbitration in the settlement of disputes under existing
contracts includes: buyers and sellers in commercial contracts, baseball players and
club owners, and divorce settlements.1
Various compulsory-arbitration schemes are, or have been, in use in many states,
yet other schemes have also been proposed. The two schemes used most often are
conventional arbitration, where the arbitrator is free to impose any settlement that
she wishes; and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration, where the arbitrator is constrained to choose
one of the ﬁnal (also called last) oﬀers of the disputing parties, without any possibility
of compromise.
Historically, conventional arbitration was implemented ﬁrst, but a number of ob-
servers of early experience with this scheme (see Stevens (1966), Feuille (1975), and
Feigenbaum (1975)) reported that the arbitrators had a tendency of splitting the dif-
ference between the positions of the parties. In the literature, this was named the
“chilling” eﬀect in bargaining. The “chilling” eﬀect implies an excessive reliance on
arbitration. Stevens (1966) proposed ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration as a remedy designed to
counteract the “chilling” eﬀect and reduce the reliance on arbitration. This newer
form of arbitration was then implemented in some states and in some industries. For
example, ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration is used in the major league baseball, while conven-
tional arbitration prevails in bargaining under commercial contracts; Lester (1984)
discusses in detail the use of both procedures in public-service collective bargain-
ing across diﬀerent states. The subsequent theoretical and experimental literature
has often questioned, or contained evidence against, the hypothesis that ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration indeed counteracts the “chilling” eﬀect.
1Lester (1984) and Najita and Stern (2001) summarize actual experience with binding arbitration
of collective bargaining in public services, and Dworkin (1986) provides a review of highlights and
controversies surrounding salary arbitration in baseball.
2The welfare criterion most emphasized in the existing literature is the reliance
on arbitration, or the percentage of conﬂicts that end up with an arbitration award.
This reﬂects the view that a quality system makes parties reach a settlement without
using the system. In particular, parties typically incur a cost of arbitration, and it
is commonly believed that an agreement for which both parties are responsible is
likely to be better for their future relations that one imposed by a binding decision
of another party. Other welfare criteria include the fairness (or appropriateness) of
the arbitrator’s awards or the settlements reached by parties themselves, and their
freedom from biases. Again, see again Lester (1984) for a discussion of the aims that
were to be achieved by state laws providing for arbitration of negotiating impasses.
Assuming no uncertainty about the arbitrator’s decision, Crawford (1979) proves
that both conventional and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration lead to equivalent outcomes. How-
ever, most of the existing literature, following Farber (1980b), assumes that the op-
timal decision from the arbitrator’s perspective is unbiased in expectation but un-
certain. The assumption that it is uncertain has ﬁrm support from the empirical
literature.2 (See Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), Farber and Bazerman (1986), or
Ashenfelter (1987).)
With uncertainty about the arbitrator’s decision, the two arbitration procedures
are no longer outcome-equivalent. A number of researchers analyze theoretically
or experimentally the reliance on arbitration under diﬀerent arbitration procedures,
in a setting with symmetric information and an uncertainty regarding the optimal
arbitrator’s decision. (See Farber and Katz (1979), Farber (1980a), Brams and Merrill
III (1983), Ashenfelter et al. (1992), Dickinson (2004), and Deck and Farmer (2007).)
However, most empiricists, such as Farber (1980a) or Lester (1984), emphasize the
diﬀerences in parties’ information as the major explanation for the failure of collec-
tive bargaining and relying on third-party decisions. Chatterjee (1981) and Samuelson
2The assumption that it is unbiased is usually motivated by the rules for selecting arbitrators.
Typically, an arbitrator is selected at least in part by a mutual agreement of the parties to a dispute;
since parties can view the arbitrator’s record in related arbitration cases, biased arbitrators are
unlikely to be selected. (See Bloom and Cavanagh (1986) for an analysis of selecting arbitrators.)
3(1991) are probably the earliest attempts at comparing diﬀerent arbitration proce-
dures under incomplete, asymmetric information. More recently, Farmer and Pecorino
(1998) and (2003) (see also Deck and Farmer (2003)) study a game-theoretic model
in which one party has private information about the expected outcome in arbitra-
tion . This information can potentially be shared with the other party. However,
the privately-informed party may wish instead to take advantage of its information
in the process of submitting ﬁnal oﬀers, which may impede settlement in collective
bargaining (in comparison to conventional arbitration).3
I also assume here that the diﬀerences in parties’ information (or beliefs) about
the expected outcome of arbitration are the major cause of the failure of collective
bargaining. However, I question the premise that the strategic concealment of in-
formation plays the key role. After all, in the early stages of most conﬂicts, parties
negotiate in the hope of resolving the conﬂict by themselves.
The key innovation of the present model is introducing a new kind of information
(or beliefs) that negotiating parties may have. I distinguish two types of signals that
may not be shared with other parties, and which seem to be common in practice.
First, arguments that are persuasive to one party may not be persuasive to the other
party.4 In such a case, the latter party may not take the arguments of the former
party into account, especially in a world in which arguments can also be made up.
In addition, parties may have noncommon prior beliefs. Intuitively, each party may
believe that the other party is simply wrong.
The key insight of this paper is that the welfare ranking of diﬀerent arbitra-
tion procedures depends crucially on whether the failure of face-to-face bargaining is
caused by the presence of unpersuasive arguments or the existence of non-common
prior beliefs.
3Farmer and Pecorino also argue that the impediments in collective bargaining disappear if
bargaining is allowed to take place after ﬁnal oﬀers have been submitted to the arbitrator.
4For example, I think that my paper provides valuable insights; otherwise, I would not bother
writing it. A reader may disagree. And each of us may well be unable to persuade the other party.
Then, no matter what the actual value of my insights is, we face a situation in which parties fail
to share their signals (or beliefs).
4I study a two-stage model. In the bargaining stage, a settlement payment is oﬀered
by one party. If the other party rejects this oﬀer, bargaining breaks down, and the
parties ﬁle a request for binding arbitration. I assume that there are two states of the
world. According to some existing contractual arrangement, one party is supposed
to give the other party a payment whose amount depends on the state of the world.
I study two scenarios: unpersuasive arguments and non-common prior beliefs.
Under the ﬁrst scenario, one party may learn an argument in support of its case,
and then present it to the other party. However, fake arguments can also be presented.
As a result, the argument presented may not be persuasive to the other party.
The arbitrator has a certain ability to recognize real and fake arguments. If this
ability is low, the probability of rejecting the settlement payment may be lower in
the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game. The intuition for this result relies on the fact that
the arbitrator can interpret ﬁnal oﬀers as signals. The arbitrator may believe, in the
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, that a party whose argument is real (and not fake) will
make a ﬁnal oﬀer that would not be optimal if it were not interpreted as a signal
about that party’s argument. This belief of the arbitrator reduces the party’s payoﬀ
to ﬁling an arbitration request, and makes the party more willing to accept lower
settlement payments.
If the arbitrator’s discriminatory ability is high, the probability of rejecting the
settlement payment may be lower in the conventional arbitration game. The intu-
ition is that privately-informed parties, in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, can extract
informational rents, as their opponent have to make ﬁnal oﬀers with an inferior in-
formation regarding the arbitrator’s decisions. Thus, the privately-informed parties
demand higher settlement payments.
Under the other scenario, each party may have a signal in favor of the outcome
that it prefers, and may believe both that its opponent has a wrong signal and that
the arbitrator will ﬁnd out that its opponent has a wrong signal. Then, some sort
of dutch-book argument applies. Parties make “exaggerated” ﬁnal oﬀers trying to
take advantage of their opponents being (in their opinion) wrong, and the “exagger-
ated” ﬁnal oﬀers move the arbitration outcome away from the existing contractual
5arrangement.
I follow Farber (1980b) in the modelling of arbitration procedures. That is, I
assume that the optimal decision from the arbitrator’s perspective is unbiased in ex-
pectation but uncertain. Under conventional arbitration, the arbitrator just imposes
the optimal decision from her perspective, while under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration, she picks
the ﬁnal oﬀer that is closer to that optimal decision.
Some other ingredients of the present model are also known from the existing
literature. For example, Gibbons (1988) studied ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration as a signaling
game, and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) studied the possibility of forging informa-
tion (making up arguments) in a diﬀerent setting.
Let us ﬁnally relate the present analysis to the existing evidence. Dworkin (1986)
reports that in the major league baseball, in which ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration is in use,
most cases are settled short of arbitration; cases in which an arbitration request ends
up being ﬁled are often characterized by widely divergent salary positions between the
parties (with a similar number of winners on each side). The case of the major league
baseball is particularly interesting for the present paper, because there seems to be
more room for noncommon prior beliefs of baseball players and club owners than for
possibly unpersuasive arguments. The version of my model with noncommon prior
beliefs indeed predicts widely divergent ﬁnal oﬀers. The model makes no prediction
regarding the frequency of cases that are settled short of arbitration, and suggests
that under conventional arbitration, the salaries would reﬂect better the value of
players for their teams.5
The rich data sets from the public-service sector cannot unfortunately be clearly
related to the predictions of the model. For example, Lester (1984) reports that
conventional arbitration awards averaged around 29 percent of total negotiations in
1960s and 1970s in Philadelphia, while in the New York State, where conventional
5One should, however, be cautious in referring to this evidence, because (as reported by Dworkin)
players who lose their cases in arbitration often gain substantial salary increases afterwards; this
suggests that, in practice, collective bargaining in baseball may depart slightly from the ﬁnal-oﬀer
scheme.
6arbitration was also in use, awards declined from 15.9 percent of total negotiations
to 9.4 percent between 1975-1976 and 1982-1983. For comparison, the average of
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration awards to total negotiations in Michigan was 16.4 percent in
the period 1973-1974 through 1976-1977, and 6.7 percent for the six-year period 1977-
1978 through 1982-1983, with the ﬁgure for 1982-1983 rising to 12 percent.
2 Model
There are two equally likely states of the world, a and b; and two risk-neutral inter-
acting agents, Ana and Brian. According to an existing contract, Ana is supposed to
make a payment of $1 to Brian, contingent on state b, but no payment is due in state
a. Brian obtains a signal about the state of the world. This signal has the following
structure: If the state of the world is b, then Brian learns an argument in support of
state b; but he learns no argument, if the state of the world is a.6 Brian presents his
argument to Ana. It is not a decision problem of Brian whether to present his argu-
ment to Ana. I assume that arguments are presented at an early (unmodelled) stage
of face-to-face negotiations, when agents may not yet have been seriously considering
the possibility of resolving their conﬂict by arbitration.
At this stage, one may ask why only one party obtains a signal about the state of
the world. I discuss this issue at the very end of this section.
I analyze two scenarios. The ﬁrst is that of possibly unpersuasive arguments (UA):
Under this scenario, Brian knows the state of the world. If he learns an argument,
he knows the state is b; if he learns no argument, he infers correctly that the
state is a. In state b, Ana ﬁnds the argument presented to her by Brian convincing
with probability ξ, in which case she learns that the state of the world is b. With
the remaining probability of 1 − ξ, Ana does not ﬁnd Brian’s argument convincing,
in which case Brian’s argument does not aﬀect her ﬁfty-ﬁfty prior about the state.
6The assumption that Brian learns an argument in support of state b with probability 1 and 0 in
states b and a, respectively, is made for the sake of simplicity; alternatively, it could be assumed that
Brian learns an argument in support of state b with probabilities p > 1/2 and q < 1/2, respectively.
7Whether Ana found Brian’s argument convincing becomes common knowledge.
In state a, Brian makes up an argument that the state is b, which he presents
to Ana. With probability ξ, Ana recognizes that the argument is fake, in which case
she concludes that the state of the world is a. With the remaining probability of
1 − ξ, Ana does not recognize that the argument has been made up. In this case,
Brian’s argument does not aﬀect Ana’s ﬁfty-ﬁfty prior about the state. Whether Ana
recognized that Brian’s argument had been made up becomes common knowledge.7
Figure 1(a) outlines this information structure in a diagram.
The other scenario analyzed is that of possibly noncommon prior beliefs (NB): In
state b, Ana ﬁnds Brian’s argument convincing with probability ξ, in which case she
learns that the state of the world is b. With the remaining probability of 1 − ξ, Ana
believes that the state of the world is a, and that Brian is mistaken in believing that
the state is b. Ana also believes that any third party will agree that the state is a.
At the same time, Brian believes both that the state of the world is b, and that Ana
is mistaken in believing that the state is a. Brian also believes that any third party
will agree that the state is b.8
In state a, Brian cannot make up arguments (or equivalently, Ana recognizes fake
arguments with probability 1). Both agents learn that the state of the world is a with
probability ξ. With the remaining probability of 1−ξ, Brian incorrectly believes that
he learned an argument, and that the state of the world is b. Ana does not ﬁnd this
argument convincing, and believes that the state of the world is a. Brian believes that
Ana is mistaken in believing that the state is a. Brian also believes that any third
party will ﬁnd his argument convincing and thus will believe that the state is b. At
the same time, Ana believes both that Brian is mistaken in believing that the state
7That is, the probability that in state a Ana fails to recognize that the argument has been made
up is equal to the probability that in state b Ana does not ﬁnd the argument presented by Brian
convincing. This assumption is made solely for the sake of simplifying statistical inference; it is not
fundamental to the analysis.
8Again, the assumption about the beliefs of both agents regarding a third party is made solely for
simplicity; alternatively, it could be assumed that each agent ﬁnds it more likely that third parties
share her own belief regarding the state of the world than they share the belief of her opponent.
8is b, and that any third party will believe that the state is a. Each party knows his or
her opponent’s beliefs. Figure 1(b) outlines this information structure in a diagram.
Under both NA and NB, the timing of the game is the same: In period 1, Ana
oﬀers a nonnegative settlement payment to Brian. Brian can accept or reject this
payment. In the former case, the payment is made and the game ends in period 1. In
the latter case, Brian ﬁles a request for arbitration. An arbitrator then decides on the
payment that Ana has to make to Brian, and the arbitrator’s decision is enforceable.
Figure 2 outlines this timing in a diagram. At this stage, one may ask why the
uninformed party, rather than the informed party, makes an oﬀer of a settlement
payment. I discuss this issue at the very end of this section.
The arbitration takes place in period 2 and imposes a legal cost of c on each agent.
This cost includes the explicit costs of arbitrators’ fees, stenographic expenses, and
renting a room for a hearing, and also includes the implicit cost of getting involved
in an arbitration procedure.9 It is reasonable to assume that
c <
1
2
.
I compare two forms of arbitration: conventional and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration. Let
us consider conventional arbitration ﬁrst.
Brian presents his (real or fake) argument to an arbitrator. Under the NA scenario,
if the argument was persuasive to Ana in state b, the arbitrator ﬁnds it persuasive
as well. Additionally, the arbitrator ﬁnds the argument persuasive with a probability
η > 0 contingent on Ana ﬁnding it unpersuasive.
In state a, the arbitrator recognizes that the argument is fake whenever Ana
recognizes that it has been made up. Additionally, the arbitrator recognizes that the
9In practice, the legal cost may not be the same for both parties. Under the labor-union-
management arbitration law in most states, the explicit costs are shared equally, but there are
exceptions (e.g., Pennsylvania). However, the assumption that the legal costs are the same is made
solely for simplicity, and it is not fundamental to the analysis.
One may also consider the scenario in which the arbitrator does not perform any independent
investigation, but the parties strategically expend resources on convincing the arbitrator to adopt
their views. Lester (1984) argues, however, that arbitrators’ duties regarding the method of collecting
evidence are often quite precisely speciﬁed, so this scenario will be rare in practice.
9argument is fake with probability η contingent on Ana not recognizing that it has
been made up.
Under the NB scenario, if Ana does not ﬁnd Brian’s argument convincing, the
arbitrator does not ﬁnd it convincing either. In that case, the arbitrator assumes
that both states of the world are equally likely. In contrast, when both agents learn
which state the world is in, the arbitrator also learns the state state.
Of course, the arbitrator is also allowed to make statistical inferences from equi-
librium strategies. For example, if under NA, Brian rejects the settlement payment
only when the state of the world is b, then the arbitrator concludes that the state is
b from the fact that the arbitration request has been ﬁled, even if she is unable to
recognize the argument of Brian directly. Following Farber (1980b), I assume that the
arbitrator is statistically objective but makes systematic mistakes. More precisely,
under conventional arbitration, Ana has to make the payment of
π = pb(1 + c) + (1 − pb)(−c) +￿ ε, (1)
where pb denotes the arbitrator’s belief that the state of the world is b at the time
in which she makes the decision regarding π, and ￿ ε is a noise term. This formula
assumes that Ana pays a share of the total legal cost 2c proportional to pb - the
fraction of $1 the arbitrator thinks is objectively justiﬁed. Since Brian had to pay
the legal cost c himself, Ana must pay him pbc +(1 − pb)(−c) to make his cost share
equal to (1 − pb)2c.10
I assume that ￿ ε is distributed symmetrically and unimodally around 0, which
implies that E￿ ε = 0. I also assume that ε has a diﬀerentiable density f(ε) which
satisﬁes the monotone hazard-rate condition
d
dε
￿
f(ε)
1 − F(ε)
￿
> 0, (2)
where F stands for the cumulative distribution. Given the assumption that f is
symmetric around 0, the monotone hazard-rate condition is equivalent to the log-
10The assumption is convenient but inessential for the analysis. It may not be satisﬁed in practice.
(See, for example, Lester (1984).)
10concavity of F, i.e., to
d
dε
￿
f(ε)
F(ε)
￿
< 0. (3)
The monotone hazard-rate assumption is satisﬁed for many probability distributions
of interest, e.g., uniform or normal. Together, the monotone hazard-rate assumption
and log-concavity will guarantee the existence of best responses in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbi-
tration game. Moreover, the two assumptions will guarantee that the best responses
are characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Let us now consider ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration. In this kind of arbitration, each agent
suggests a payment (makes a ﬁnal oﬀer) of πA and πB, respectively, and the arbitrator
selects the ﬁnal oﬀer that is closer to the payment the arbitrator thinks is objectively
justiﬁed. This objectively justiﬁed payment π is given by formula (1). However, as I
explain later, the value pb is determined in equilibrium, and so it is typically diﬀerent
for the two arbitration procedures.
Ana has to pay πA if
| πA − π |<| πB − π |,
and she has to pay πB if the opposite inequality holds. Assume that the arbitrator
tosses a fair coin in the case of equality.
In practice, the arbitrator can elicit ﬁnal oﬀers under conventional arbitration as
well, and this is what usually happens there. The diﬀerence between the two schemes
is that under conventional arbitration, the arbitrator is not committed to choosing
one of the ﬁnal oﬀers.11
I will now explain how the value pb is determined. If the arbitrator ﬁnds the argu-
ment of Brian convincing, which can happen only in state b, then pb = 1. Similarly,
if the arbitrator recognizes that the argument is fake (i.e., learns that the state of the
world is a), then pb = 0. In the alternative case in which the arbitrator does not ﬁnd
the argument of Brian persuasive and does not recognize that the argument is fake,
11It is interesting to note here that in the ﬁrst years of arbitration in New Jersey, a number
of cases were prepared and mediated under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration. However, after the parties had
already revealed their positions, the cases were converted into conventional arbitration to facilitate
the drafting of the agreement and to avoid having to select a winner.
11she makes a statistical inference, so that the value of pb is determined by: equilibrium
strategies, the settlement payment oﬀered to Brian, and - under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration
- the ﬁnal oﬀers.
To conduct a welfare analysis of the two forms of arbitration, I apply two criteria.
The ﬁrst criterion reﬂects the fact that a request for arbitration is costly as each
agent must pay the legal cost c. Perhaps more importantly, negotiated settlements are
typically better for the future relations between the disputing parties than settlements
imposed by a third party. I will therefore compare the probabilities of ﬁling an
arbitration request in the equilibria of the two arbitration games. If this probability of
ﬁling an arbitration request is higher under one form of arbitration than another, then
I will say that the deadweight-loss of that form of arbitration exceeds the deadweight
loss of the other form.12
Denote by wA and wB the total payoﬀ of Ana and Brian, respectively. Note that
wB = −wA is equal to the settlement payment made by Ana in period 1, if the game
ends in period 1; and wB = π − c and wA = −π − c if the game ends in period 2
and the arbitrator orders Ana to pay π to Brian. Note also that the comparison of
the probabilities of ﬁling an arbitration request is equivalent to the comparison of the
expected values of wA + wB; and since agents are risk-neutral, wA + wB represents
the sum of the expected utilities of both agents.
The second criterion reﬂects the fact that one may wish to depart as little as
possible from the existing contract, namely, wB = 1 and wA = −1 in state b and
wA = wB = 0 in state a. Agents may want to do this for a number of reasons.
Suppose, for example, that Brian is to make an unobservable investment that will
12I follow here most of the literature on arbitration, which focuses on minimizing the reliance on
arbitration. Of course, one may criticize this focus by saying that if that were really the goal, no
form of arbitration would do better than threatening both parties with some very bad outcome if
they did not agree on a settlement.
However, there are many good arguments which counter this criticism; one of them claims that
if the threat of a very bad outcome were the reason for reaching a settlement, then settlements
negotiated under that condition would probably no longer be better for the future relations between
the disputing parties than settlements imposed by a third party.
12beneﬁt Ana in state b; and Brian is to be compensated by Ana, contingent on state
b. In such a case, one may wish the compensation to be enforceable in order to give
Brian appropriate incentives for making this unobservable investment. In the present
paper, I do not model any speciﬁc reason for minimizing any departure from the
existing contract. Instead, I will simply compare the expected loss caused by such a
departure,
E[l(|wA + 1|,|wB − 1|) | b] + E[l(|wA|,|wB|) | a],
where l stands for a loss function which increases in both arguments, and which takes
the value 0 at 0. If this expected loss is lower under one form of arbitration than
another, then I will say that form is more outcome-accurate than the other form.
I have made a number of assumptions only for the sake of simplicity of exposition,
including the assumptions that states a and b are equally likely and that parties face
identical legal costs c. Other assumptions are necessary to make the analysis tractable,
including the assumption that only one party can learn an argument in support of its
case, and the assumption that it is the uninformed party (rather than the informed
party) who makes an oﬀer of a settlement payment. If an oﬀer of a settlement payment
were made by a privately informed party, the model would contain a signalling game
in period 1, since the settlement payment oﬀered by the privately informed party
could be used as a signal about this party’s private information. The analysis would
then be rather intractable, as this signalling game from period 1 would be followed,
in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, by the signalling game of period 2 in which the
ﬁnal oﬀer of any privately informed party is also used as a signal about this party’s
private information.
Even worse, the equilibrium probability of accepting the settlement payment (even
under conventional arbitration) would be “too” belief-driven, and so undetermined.
Indeed, suppose ﬁrst that the arbitrator believes that the state of the world is a
unless the privately informed agent oﬀers some low settlement payment. Feeling
threatened by this belief, the privately-informed agent may indeed oﬀer this low
settlement payment, independently of the state of the world; and this settlement
payment may be accepted with probability 1 by the other agent. Suppose nowthat the
13arbitrator believes that the state of the world is a unless the privately-informed agent
oﬀers some high settlement payment. Feeling threatened by this belief once again, the
privately informed agent may oﬀer this high settlement payment, independently of
the state of the world; and this settlement payment may be rejected with probability
1 by the other agent.
3 Unpersuasive Arguments
3.1 Conventional Arbitration
I shall now characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the conventional arbitration
game. First, I summarize what can happen at the beginning of period 1. There are
the following possibilities: (1) both agents know the state of the world; (2) Brian
knows that the state is b, but Ana does not ﬁnd Brian’s argument persuasive; (3)
Brian knows that the state is a, but Ana does not recognize that the argument Brian
presented to her has been made up. The analysis of possibility (1) is straightforward.
Since both agents have the same expectation regarding the arbitrator’s decision, Ana
oﬀers the settlement payment that makes Brian exactly indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting the oﬀer. (If the oﬀer that makes Brian indiﬀerent is negative, then
Ana oﬀers a settlements payment of 0.) It follows that Ana oﬀers 0 in state a and 1
in state b. Brian accepts the oﬀer made and the game ends in period 1.
Claim 1 If Brian has an argument and Ana ﬁnds that argument of Brian per-
suasive, then Ana oﬀers a settlement payment of $1, which Brian accepts. If Brian
makes up his argument and Ana recognizes that the argument is fake, then Ana oﬀers
no payment, and which Brian accepts.
Cases (2) and (3) have to be analyzed simultaneously, since Ana cannot distinguish
between the two cases. Recall that in both cases Brian knows the state of the world;
on the other hand, Ana does not know the state and believes that both states are
equally likely. An Brian who knows that the state of the world is a (call his type a) is
14willing to accept a strictly lower settlement payment than is an Brian who knows that
the state of the world is b (call his type b). This is so, because there is a probability
η > 0 that the arbitrator will learn about the state of the world even when Ana does
not. In Appendix A, I prove a slightly stronger claim:
Claim 2 Suppose that Brian has an argument and Ana does not ﬁnd the argument
of Brian persuasive, or Brian makes up an argument but Ana does not recognize that
Brian’s argument is fake. In equilibrium, there are only the following two possibilities:
both types of Brian accept the settlement payment with probability 1, or type a accepts
the settlement payment with some probability q ∈ [0,1] and type b rejects this payment
with probability 1.
First, I will characterize the equilibria in which type a is indiﬀerent between ac-
cepting and rejecting the settlement payment and type b rejects this payment with
probability 1. Denote by β the probability assigned by the arbitrator to the event
that Brian’s type is b when the arbitrator does not ﬁnd the argument of Brian con-
vincing but cannot tell whether that the argument has been made up. For every
β ∈ [1/2,1], denote by sβ the expected payoﬀ of type a contingent on ﬁling a request
for arbitration, given the value of β. If type a ﬁles such a request, then he faces the
compound lottery that yields
−c+￿ ε−c with probability η and β(1+c)−(1−β)c+￿ ε−c with probability 1−η, (4)
i.e.,
sβ = (1 − η)β − 2c[η + (1 − η)(1 − β)]. (5)
In equilibrium, type a accepts the settlement payment with probability q. So, by the
Bayes rule, the arbitrator must believe (contingent on the rejection of the settlement
payment) that Brian’s type is b with probability β, given by
β =
1
2 − q
. (6)
If type a is to be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the settlement payment,
this payment must be equal to the sβ given by (5) for β given by (6).
15Notice that sβ increases with β. Depending on c and η, it can happen that
sβ is negative (even for all β ∈ [1/2,1]). However, the settlement payment must, by
assumption, be nonnegative. Deﬁne S as the interval (possibly empty or degenerated)
consisting of all nonnegative sβ. In Appendix A, I show that:
Claim 3 In every equilibrium such that type a is indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting the settlement payment and type b rejects this payment with probability
1, the settlement payment oﬀered by Ana has to maximize her payoﬀ over the interval
S, under the assumption that any sβ from this interval will be accepted by type a with
probability q given by (6).
Roughly speaking, this claim follows from the assumption that Ana makes take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀers in period 1; the actual argument is slightly more subtle as an
oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀer of sγ need not be accepted by type a with probability q given by
(6) for β = γ contingent on the rejection of sγ.
In Appendix A, I prove the following characterization of other equilibria in which
type a accepts the settlement payment with some probability q ∈ [0,1] and type b
rejects this payment with probability 1:
Claim 4 (a) Every equilibrium such that both types of Brian reject the settlement
payment with probability 1 is outcome-equivalent to an equilibrium with the settlement
payment equal to s1/2, in which type a is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
this settlement payment.
(b) In every equilibrium such that type a accepts the settlement payment with
probability 1 and type b rejects the settlement payment with probability 1, type a
must be indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting this payment or the settlement
payment must be equal to 0.
Moreover, if the equilibrium settlement payment is equal to 0 and type a is not
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting this payment, then s1 < 0.
I will now turn to the existence of equilibria in which type a accepts the settlement
payment with some probability q ∈ [0,1] and type b rejects this settlement payment
16with probability 1. Notice that such an equilibrium exists only if Ana’s payoﬀ is no
lower than the payoﬀ to oﬀering s = 1 that is accepted with probability 1 by both
types of Brian. This is so because any oﬀer higher than 1 guarantees that both types
of Brian accept the settlement payment.
On the other hand, one can easily verify that if the constraint from the previous
paragraph is satisﬁed, then for every sβ ∈ S that maximizes Ana’s payoﬀ over this
interval (assuming that the rejection of any sβ results in the arbitrator’s belief that
Brian’s type is b with probability β), there exists an equilibrium in which Ana oﬀers
the settlement payment sβ. In this equilibrium, (i) the arbitrator believes that Brian’s
type is b with probability 1/2 contingent on the rejection of any settlement payment
0 ≤ s < s1/2, and no type accepts any payment 0 ≤ s < s1/2; (ii) the arbitrator
believes that Brian’s type is b with probability γ contingent on the rejection of any
settlement payment sγ ∈ S; type a accepts such a payment sγ with the probability q
given by (6) in which β is replaced with γ, and type b rejects this payment sγ with
probability 1; (iii) the arbitrator believes that Brian’s type is b with probability 1
contingent on the rejection of the settlement payment s > s1; type a accepts any
such oﬀer, and type b accepts only oﬀers s ≥ 1.
Similarly, it is easy to see that if s1 < 0, then Ana’s payoﬀ to oﬀering no settlement
payment (accepted by type a and rejected by type b) is no lower than the payoﬀ to
oﬀering s = 1 that is accepted with probability 1 by both types of Brian. Therefore,
there exists an equilibrium with the settlement payment equal to 0, which is accepted
with probability 1 by type a and rejected with probability 1 by type b.
I have shown that:
Claim 5 Let UA
β denote the expected payoﬀ of Ana to making the oﬀer sβ that is
accepted by type a with probability q given by (6) and rejected by type b with probability
1. There exists an equilibrium in which type a accepts the settlement payment with
some probability q ∈ [0,1] and type b rejects this settlement payment with probability
1 if and only if
s1 < 0 or s1 ≥ 0 and max
sβ∈S
U
A
β ≥ − 1.
17To ﬁnd the settlement payment sβ that maximizes Ana’s payoﬀ over the interval
S, one can compare the marginal cost and beneﬁt of an increase in the parameter β.
Such an increase implies an increase in the probability with which type a of Brian
accepts the settlement payment; and Ana saves then on the legal cost; as well as, she
extracts the premium that Brian is willing to pay in order to avoid the legal cost.
This means that the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in β is
1
2
(2c)
dq
dβ
=
c
β
2. (7)
An increase in β also implies that Ana has to make a higher settlement payment.
This higher payment has to be made both when Brian accepts the settlement payment
and also, because of an increase in the arbitrator’s belief that Brian’s type is b, when
she rejects the settlement payment. Therefore, the marginal cost of such an increase
is
dsβ
dβ
= (1 − η)(1 + 2c) (8)
(with the derivative having been derived from (5)).
The marginal cost is therefore constant, and the marginal beneﬁt is decreasing in
β. The equilibrium sβ can therefore be determined by making the two equal, i.e.,
β = 2
￿
c
(1 − η)(1 + 2c)
, (9)
unless we have one of the corner solutions. If the right-hand side exceeds 1, and then
β = 1. If the right-hand side falls below 1/2, then β = 1/2 (or if it falls below β
∗
such that sβ∗ = 0, then β = β
∗).
I will now turn to equilibria in which both types of Brian accept the equilibrium
settlement payment with probability 1. In any equilibrium with this property, the
settlement payment s must satisfy two constraints. First, it must belong to the
interval [r0,1] where
r0 := η − 2c(1 − η).
Indeed, type b would not accept any lower settlement payment than r0, because when
he rejects the settlement payment, he would at worst face the compound lottery that
18yields
1 +￿ ε with probability η and − c +￿ ε − c with probability 1 − η
whose expected value is equal to r0. On the other hand, both types of Brian must
accept the settlement payment of 1, as they cannot expect any higher payoﬀ by ﬁling
a request for arbitration.
Second, Ana’s payoﬀ to making the oﬀer s, assuming that it will be accepted by
both types, cannot be lower than the payoﬀ to making any oﬀer sβ ∈ S with sβ < s,
when S ￿= ∅ (i.e., when s1 ≥ 0), assuming that the rejection of sβ results in the
arbitrator’s belief β that Brian’s type is b. When s1 < 0 (i.e., S = ∅), Ana’s payoﬀ to
making the oﬀer s cannot be lower than the payoﬀ to oﬀering no settlement payment,
assuming that it will be accepted by type a and rejected by type b. This follows
from an analogous argument to that used in the analysis of equilibria in which type
a accepts the settlement payment with some probability q ∈ [0,1] and type b rejects
this payment with probability 1.
On the other hand, one can easily verify that there exists an equilibrium in which
Ana oﬀers a settlement payment s satisfying the above two constraints, and both
types of Brian accept this payment with probability 1. Consider the case of S ￿= ∅
(or s1 ≥ 0). The case of s1 < 0 (i.e., S = ∅) is analogous. In this equilibrium, the
arbitrator believes that: (i) Brian’s type is a (i.e., is b with probability 0), contingent
on the rejection of s or any higher oﬀer; (ii) she believes that Brian’s type is b with
probability 1/2, contingent on the rejection of any oﬀer both lower than s and lower
than s1/2; (iii) she believes that the probability is β, contingent on the rejection of any
oﬀer sβ ∈ S with sβ < s; and (iv) she believes that the probability is 1, contingent
on the rejection of any oﬀer lower than s but higher than s1. In period 1, Brian
responds to Ana’s oﬀer as follows: (i) the settlement payment of s (or any higher
one) gets accepted by both types of Brian; (ii) settlement payments both lower than
s and lower than s1/2 get rejected by both types of Brian; (ii) the payment sβ ∈ S
with sβ < s gets accepted by type a with probability q given by (6) and rejected by
type b with probability 1; and (iv) settlement payments lower than s but higher than
s1 get accepted by type a and get rejected by type b.
19I have thus proved that:
Claim 6 Given an s ≥ 0, there exists an equilibrium in which both types of Brian
accept the settlement payment s if and only if
s ∈ [r0,1]
and
s1 ≥ 0and max
sβ∈S,sβ≤s
U
A
β ≤ −sor s1 < 0and −
1
2
(1 + 2c) ≤ −s.
To summarize, it follows easily from Claims 5 and 6 that the conventional arbi-
tration game has an equilibrium for any set of parameters of the model. Indeed, the
conditions maxsβ∈S UA
β < − 1 and maxsβ∈S,sβ≤s UA
β > −s (for s = 1) are mutually
exclusive. It is also clear that for a range of parameters, there exist only equilib-
ria in which the settlement payment is accepted by type a with some probability
and rejected by type b with probability 1; while for another range, there exist only
equilibria in which the settlement payment is accepted by both types of Brian. In
addition, there is also a range of parameters with equilibria of each of the two sorts.
3.2 Final-Oﬀer Arbitration
As is usually the case in signalling games, the continuation game beginning in period
2 has multiple equilibria, including separating, pooling, and a number of kinds of hy-
brid equilibria. This multiplicity makes it diﬃcult to obtain any insight into a general
value of the parameter η. Thus, I will analyze only the two polar cases - where η close
to 0 and where η close to 1 - for which some insight can be obtained. The former case
approximates symmetric-information settings which have been studied extensively in
the existing literature. In this case, Brian has superior private information about
the state of the world, but this information tells his rather little about the expected
outcome in arbitration. The latter case approximates a standard game of asymmet-
ric information, similar to ones studied by Farmer and Pecorino (1998) and (2003).
However, the present model will provide novel insights into each of the two cases.
Additionally, the two polar cases exhibit strategic eﬀects, which are present for any
20value of η, but which become dominant (and therefore easier to describe) only for the
extreme values.
Two initial observations apply to any value of the parameter η. First, equilibria
exist (see Appendix B for the proof):
Proposition 1 Under the additional assumption that ﬁnal oﬀers have to belong to
an interval [−C,1+C], where the value of C can be arbitrarily large but exogenously
given, there exists an equilibrium of the two-stage ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game.
Second, the equilibria of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game have the same form as
the equilibria of the conventional arbitration game. More speciﬁcally, either the set-
tlement payment is accepted by type a with some probability q ∈ [0,1] and rejected
by type b with probability 1 or both types accept the settlement payment with prob-
ability 1. This follows from arguments similar to the ones used in my analysis of the
conventional arbitration game.13
Remark To prove Proposition 1, I apply a ﬁxed-point theorem, which requires
the compactness of the action space. This is the reason for making the additional
assumption that the ﬁnal oﬀers have to belong to a bounded interval. It is an open
question if this additional assumption can be disregarded.
The assumptions of the present setting do not guarantee the single-crossing prop-
erty in the ﬁnal-oﬀer continuation game that begins in period 2. Thus, the equilibria
can be of a form rather diﬀerent from the form of the equilibria of signalling games
studied in the existing literature.
A single-crossing property can be obtained under some additional assumption of
the cdf of the noise term ￿ ε. One can then show the existence of equilibria without
assuming that the ﬁnal oﬀers have to belong to a bounded interval, and these equilibria
can be characterized by methods similar to ones used in the existing literature on
signalling games.
13The only diﬀerence is that under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration there exist equilibria in which type a
accepts with probability 1, and type b rejects with probability 1, yet type a is not indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting.
213.3 The case of small η
Consider ﬁrst the conventional arbitration game. It follows from(9) (and the comment
following (9)) that for every η close enough to 0, only two kinds of equilibria are
possible: one such that the settlement payment is rejected with probability 1 by
both types of Brian, and one such that it is accepted with probability 1 by both
types of Brian. Furthermore, it follows from Claim 5 that there always exists an
equilibrium in which both types of Brian reject the settlement payment; indeed,
s1/2 ≈ (1 − c)/2 > 0, s1 ≈ 1 and maxsβ∈S UA
β = −(1 + 2c)/2 > − 1. And it follows
from Claim 6 that for an interval of settlement payments s there exists an equilibrium
in which both types of Brian accept the settlement payment of s; indeed, r0 ≈ −2c
and maxsβ∈S,sβ≤s UA
β ≈ −(1 + 2c)/2 < −s when (1 − c)/2 < s < (1 + 2c)/2.
The ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game also has multiple equilibria. First, observe that
every equilibrium outcome of the conventional arbitration game can be achieved, in
the limit as η = 0, in an equilibrium of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game. More precisely,
suppose that in every continuation game beginning in period 2 in which Brian’s type
is b with probability β, agents play the pooling equilibrium in which the arbitrator
believes that Brian’s type is b with probability β independently of his ﬁnal oﬀer.14 In
this equilibrium, the arbitrator makes no inference from the ﬁnal oﬀer of Brian. Ana
therefore chooses πA to minimize and Brian chooses πB to maximize
F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
πA +
￿
1 − F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿
πB,
where F β is the cdf of β(1+c)+(1−β)(−c)+￿ ε. The oﬀers are thus jointly determined
14The result that the equilibrium outcomes of the conventional arbitration game can be achieved
(in the limit as η = 0) in equilibria of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game typically does not hold under
risk-aversion, because under the two procedures parties are exposed to diﬀerent types of risk in
period 2.
In the early literature on arbitration (summarized in Farber (1980a)), this diﬀerent type of risk
was perceived as the main source of the diﬀerence in welfare consequences of the two procedures.
22by the following two ﬁrst-order conditions:
πB − πA
2
=
F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
fβ(
πA + πB
2
)
,
and
πB − πA
2
=
1 − Fβ
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
fβ(
πA + πB
2
)
.
It follows immediately from these ﬁrst-order conditions that πA < πB and that β(1+
c) + (1 − β)(−c) is the middle of the segment [πA,πB]. With probability (1 − η)/2
(which is close to 1/2), each of the two ﬁnal oﬀers is chosen by the arbitrator; and
with probability η the oﬀer of Ana is chosen in state a and the oﬀer of Brian is chosen
in state b. The total payoﬀ of Brian tends to −c+ β(1 + c) + (1 − β)(−c) as η tends
to 0 (while the total payoﬀ of Ana tends to −c − β(1 + c) − (1 − β)(−c)).
It is easy to see now that every equilibrium outcome of the two-stage conventional
arbitration game can be achieved, in the limit as η = 0, in an equilibrium of the
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, in which agents anticipate a pooling equilibria in period
2 contingent on the rejection of any settlement payment in period 1.
Now consider another pooling equilibrium of the continuation game beginning in
period 2. Suppose that if Brian’s type is b with probability β, then Brian responds
optimally to his opponent’s oﬀer assuming that F0 is the cdf of the arbitrator’s peak
points; Ana best responds to her opponent’s oﬀer assuming that Fβ is the cdf of the
arbitrator’s peak points. Notice that this is indeed an equilibrium, if for any out-of-
equilibrium oﬀer of Brian, the arbitrator believes that his type is b with probability
0.
The oﬀers in this equilibrium are jointly determined by the following two ﬁrst-
order conditions:
πB − πA
2
=
F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
fβ(
πA + πB
2
)
; (10)
23πB − πA
2
=
1 − F 0
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
f0(
πA + πB
2
)
. (11)
I shall now describe an equilibrium of the two-stage game in which agents antici-
pate pooling equilibria described by (10)-(11) in period 2, and the settlement payment
is accepted with some probability by type a and rejected with probability 1 by type
b. Since this settlement payment must make type a indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting, it has to be equal to
tβ := −2cη + (1 − η)
￿
πAF
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ πB
￿
1 − F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
, (12)
where πA and πB are jointly determined by (10) and (11).
The equilibrium value of β can be derived in a manner similar to (9) (see also
the comment following (9)), i.e., by comparing the marginal cost and beneﬁt of an
increase in parameter β. The marginal beneﬁt is given by (7), and the marginal cost
is given by
dtβ
dβ
=
d
￿
(1 − η)πAF β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ (1 − η)πB
￿
1 − Fβ
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
dβ
.
Lemma 1 For any β ≥ 1/2,
dtβ
dβ
<
dsβ
dβ
.
Recall that sβ denotes the settlement payment in the conventional arbitration
game which makes type a indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting, assuming that
the rejection of sβ results in the arbitrator’s belief β that Brian’s type is b.
Proof. See Appendix A
The comparison of the marginal costs and beneﬁts of an increase in β implies that
the equilibrium β in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game can be higher than that in the
conventional arbitration game (see Figure 3(a)). In other words, the deadweight-loss
in ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration can be lower than that in conventional arbitration.
24Figure 3 here!
Not much can be said in terms of the outcome accuracy of the two equilibria.
Final-oﬀer arbitration can, but need not, beneﬁt Ana at the expense of Brian, but
this is independent of the state of the world.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion of this section:
Proposition 2 For every η close enough to 0, both games have two kinds of
equilibria.
(a) In one of them, the settlement payment is rejected with probability 1 by both
types of Brian under conventional arbitration; under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration, however,
the settlement payment may be accepted, depending on the parameters of the model,
with a positive probability by type a (while it is rejected with probability 1 by type b).
The deadweight-loss of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration then falls below that of conventional
arbitration.
(b) In the other kind of equilibria, the settlement payment is accepted with prob-
ability 1 by both types of Brian, under both conventional arbitration and ﬁnal-oﬀer
arbitration, which implies that the deadweight-losses of the two procedures are equal.
The basic and rough intuition behind part (a) can be explained as follows: The
ﬁnal oﬀer of a privately-informed party contains a signal about the party’s type. The
signalling may be costly. This cost makes lower settlement payments (compared to
ones under conventional arbitration) acceptable for some privately-informed parties.
The signalling cost may be positive as long as there is an uncertainty regarding the
privately-informed party’s type. Therefore, the deadweight-loss of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitra-
tion may fall below that of conventional arbitration even when the private information
is virtually negligible.
One possible conclusion from part (a) is that when the percentage of ﬁling requests
for arbitration in total negotiations is very high under conventional arbitration, re-
placing it with ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration can indeed be helpful in encouraging collective
bargaining. This seems especially possible when the arbitrator expects privately-
25informed parties to signal that they have arguments supporting their cases by mak-
ing ﬁnal oﬀers that would not be optimal if they contained no signal about available
arguments.
3.4 The case of large η
Consider ﬁrst the conventional arbitration game. It follows from (5) that s1 ≈ −2c <
0 (that is, S = ∅) for every η close enough to 1. Therefore, by Claims 4 and 5, the
conventional arbitration game has an equilibrium in which the settlement payment
is equal to 0, type a accepts this settlement payment with probability 1, and type b
rejects it with probability 1; and this is the only equilibrium in which type b rejects
the settlement payment. Furthermore, by Claim 6, there is no equilibrium in which
the settlement payment is accepted by both types of Brian; indeed, r0 ≈ 1 and
−1
2(1 + 2c) > −s for s ∈ [r0,1].
Consider now the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game in the limit case when η = 1. Sup-
pose that Brian’s type is b with probability β in the continuation game beginning in
period 2. In equilibrium, type a best responds to Ana’s ﬁnal oﬀer, knowing that F 0
will be the cdf of the arbitrator’s peak point; and type b best responds to Ana’s ﬁnal
oﬀer, knowing that F1 will be the cdf of the arbitrator’s peak point. On the other
hand, Ana best responds to Brian’s ﬁnal oﬀers, assuming that his type (and the state
of the world) is b with probability β and that the arbitrator will know the state of
the world when making the decision. That is, πA, πB,a, and πB,b in the continuation
game beginning in period 2 where Brian’s type is b with probability β can be uniquely
determined by the following set of ﬁrst-order conditions:
πB,b − πA
2
=
1 − F 1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
f1(
πA + πB,b
2
)
, (13)
26πB,a − πA
2
=
1 − F 0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
f0(
πA + πB,a
2
)
, (14)
0 = (1 − β)
￿
F
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
−
πB,a − πA
2
f
0(
πA + πB,a
2
)
￿
(15)
+β
￿
F
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
−
πB,b − πA
2
f
1(
πA + πB,b
2
)
￿
.
The two-stage game has an equilibrium in which the settlement payment is ac-
cepted with some probability by type a and rejected with probability 1 by type b;
consequently, the probability that Brian is of type b contingent on the rejection of
this payment is equal to some β ≥ 1/2. This equilibrium β can be determined by
comparing the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of an increase in the parameter β.
The marginal beneﬁt is given by (7), and the marginal cost is given by:
1
2
d
￿
πAF 0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
+ πB,a
￿
1 − F 0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿￿￿
dβ
(16)
+
1
2
d
￿
πAF1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
+ πB,b
￿
1 − F1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿￿￿
dβ
.
Lemma 2 The marginal cost given by (16) is strictly greater than 0 for β > 1/2,
and is equal to 0 for β = 1/2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
By Lemma 2 taken together with (8), the marginal cost of an increase in β under
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration is greater than that under conventional arbitration. Thus, the
equilibrium β is no higher, and can be lower, under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration compared
to conventional arbitration (see Figure 3(b)).
There is no equilibrium in the two-stage game, in which the settlement payment is
accepted with probability 1 by both types of Brian. Indeed, the settlement payment
that could be accepted by both types of Brian has to be at least $1, which is the
payoﬀ of type b in the continuation game which begins in period 2 and in which
27Brian is of type b with probability 1. It is easy to see that the payoﬀ of type b is even
higher in the continuation game which begins in period 2 and in which Brian is of
type b with a probability β < 1. However, a settlement payment of $1, even if it is
accepted by both types of Brian, makes the payoﬀ of Ana lower than that to oﬀering
no settlement payment, which must be accepted by type a.
Summarizing, and applying the upper hemi-continuity of the set equilibrium out-
comes of the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, I obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For every η close enough to 1, the conventional arbitration game
has a unique equilibrium outcome. The ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game has only one sort
of equilibrium outcome.
(a) Under conventional arbitration, the payment of $0 is oﬀered in period 1. This
payment is accepted with probability 1 by type a and is rejected with probability 1 by
type b.
Under ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration the settlement payment can be equal to $0 or it can
be positive, depending on the parameters of the model. When the settlement payment
is equal to $0, it is accepted with probability 1 by type a and rejected with probability
1 by type b. When the settlement payment is positive, it is accepted by type a only
with a probability q < 1 (while it is rejected with probability 1 by type b). That is,
the deadweight-loss of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration never falls below, and may exceed, that of
conventional arbitration; in addition, ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration is never more, and may
be less, outcome-accurate than conventional arbitration.
The intuitioncan be explained as follows: Final-oﬀer arbitration allows the privately-
informed party to extract some informational rent at the expense of the uninformed
party, because the uninformed party makes its ﬁnal oﬀer with inferior information
about the arbitrator. The rent of the privately-informed party of type a increases
with the uninformed party’s belief that it is type b. This reduces the uninformed
party’s willingness to oﬀering higher settlement payments, since settlement payments
are accepted more willingly by type a; and this in turn raises the belief that the
privately-informed party’s type is b, contingent on rejection. Consequently, higher
28settlement payments raise the rent of type a of the privately-informed party.
On the other hand, the rent of type b of the privately-informed party decreases
with the uninformed party’s belief that its type is b. Thus, higher settlement payments
reduce the rent of type b of the privately-informed party. The total eﬀect of a higher
settlement payment on the rent cost of the uninformed party is therefore impossible
to determine in general. However, the rent of type a increases by more than the rent
of type b decreases. This makes the rent cost of the uninformed party positive when
this party makes ﬁnal oﬀers in the belief that the probability of type b exceeds the
probability assigned to type b at the beginning of the game.
4 NonCommon Prior Beliefs
The analysis of this scenario is relatively simple. If Brian has no argument and he
does not (incorrectly) believe that he has one, or if he has an argument and Ana ﬁnds
her argument persuasive, then the arbitrator also learns that the state of the world
is a or b, respectively. In both cases, agents have identical, correct beliefs about the
arbitrator’s decision. If Brian has an argument and Ana does not ﬁnd it convincing,
then the agents diﬀer in their beliefs about the arbitrator’s decision; Ana believes
that the arbitrator believes that the state is a, and Brian believes that the arbitrator
believes that the state is b, while the arbitrator believes that both states are equally
likely. Similarly, if Brian has no argument but he incorrectly believes that he has one,
the agents diﬀer in their beliefs about the arbitrator’s decision.
If both agents have the same belief about the arbitrator’s decision, then Ana oﬀers
the settlement payment that makes Brian indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
the oﬀer. (If the oﬀer that makes Brian indiﬀerent is negative, then Ana oﬀers the
settlement payment of 0.) By rejecting Ana’s oﬀer, Brian ends up with the payoﬀ of
−2c + ￿ ε when all agents know that the state is a, and the payoﬀ of 1 + ￿ ε when all
agents know that the state is b. Thus, the settlement payments in the two cases are
0 and 1, respectively. These settlement payments get accepted by Brian.
If the agents have diﬀerent beliefs about the arbitrator’s decision, Ana is not
29willing to oﬀer more than 0, and Brian is not willing to accept less than 1. Thus,
Brian rejects the settlement payment oﬀered by Ana. In the conventional arbitration
game, the arbitrator imposes on Ana a payment of 1/2 +￿ ε.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion on conventional arbitration:
Proposition 4 The conventional arbitration game has a unique equilibrium out-
come.
(a) In this equilibrium outcome, if Brian has no argument and he does not incor-
rectly believe that he has one, the game ends in period 1, and no payment is made.
(b) If Brian has an argument and Ana ﬁnds the argument of Brian convincing,
the game also ends in period 1. Then, the payment made by Ana is equal to 1.
(c) If each agent believes that his or her opponent is mistaken, the game ends in
period 2. Then, the random payment made by Ana is equal to
1/2 +￿ ε.
In the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game, if the play reaches period 2, Ana and Brian
choose their ﬁnal oﬀers πA and πB, respectively, to maximize
F
A
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
(−πA) +
￿
1 − F
A
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿
(−πB), (17)
and
F
B
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
πA +
￿
1 − F
B
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿
πB, (18)
respectively, given the ﬁnal oﬀer of his or her opponent. If the agents have the same
belief about the decision, F A = F B is the cumulative distribution of the random
variable pb(1+c)+(1−pb)(−c)+￿ ε, where pb denotes the arbitrator’s belief that the
state of the world is b at the time in which the arbitrator makes her decision. Notice
that pb = 0 if Brian has no argument, and pb = 1 if Brian has an argument which is
recognized by Ana. If the agents have diﬀerent beliefs about the arbitrator’s decision,
F A = F0 is the cumulative distribution of −c + ￿ ε, and F B = F 1 is the cumulative
distribution of (1 + c) + ￿ ε; this happens when each agent believes that his or her
opponent is mistaken.
30It is easy to see that in any equilibrium πA ≤ πB. Moreover, by (2) and (3) from
Section 2, πA and πB are determined by the ﬁrst-order conditions:
πB − πA
2
=
F A
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
fA(
πA + πB
2
)
, (19)
πB − πA
2
=
1 − F B
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
fB(
πA + πB
2
)
. (20)
Note that by (3), the right-hand side of (19) is nondecreasing in πA, and the
left-hand side of (19) is decreasing in πA. Since the left-hand side is equal to 0
for πA = πB, and the right-hand side is positive, the equilibrium πA satisﬁes (19).
Similarly, by (2), the right-hand side of (20) is nonincreasing in πB, and the left-hand
side of (20) is increasing in πB. Since the left-hand side is equal to 0 for πB = πA,
and the right-hand side is positive, the equilibrium πB satisﬁes (20).
The following proposition summarizes the discussion on ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration:
Proposition 5 The ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game has a unique equilibrium outcome.
(a) In this equilibrium outcome, if Brian has no argument and he does not incor-
rectly believe that he has one, the game ends in period 1, and no payment is made.
(b) If Brian has an argument and Ana ﬁnds the argument of Brian convincing,
the game also ends in period 1. Then, the payment made by Ana is equal to 1.
(c) If each agent believes that his or her opponent is mistaken, the game ends in
period 2. The equilibrium ﬁnal oﬀers are jointly determined by (19) and (20).
Having characterized the equilibria of the two arbitration games, I can now com-
pare their welfare properties. The two equilibrium outcomes diﬀer only in the case in
which each agent believes that his or her opponent is mistaken. I claim that, under
some mild assumptions about the density function f and the legal costs c, conven-
tional arbitration is more outcome-accurate than ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration. To state my
result I need the following deﬁnition. Recall that if f is the density of ￿ ε, then f1/2
31stands for the density of 1/2 +￿ ε. The density function f is said to be up to δ in an
interval [−z,z] when
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ∞
−∞l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f1/2(x)dx−
−
￿ 1/2+z
1/2−z l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f1/2(x)dx
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
≤ δ
and
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ∞
−∞
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx −
￿ 1/2+z
1/2−z
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
≤ δ.
Note that, under conventional arbitration,
E[l(|wA + 1|,|wB − 1|) | b] =
￿ ∞
−∞
l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f
1/2(x)dx
and
E[l(|wA|,|wB|) | a] =
￿ ∞
−∞
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx.
In other words, a density function is up to δ in an interval [−z,z] if its tails (i.e.,
realizations to the left of −z and to the right of z) can be disregarded for the sake of
reaching an approximate solution. It seems reasonable to assume that the tails will
not matter much for z = 1/2.
Proposition 6 Suppose that c ≤ 1/2. There exists δ > 0 such that if the density
function f of the noise term ￿ ε is up to δ in the interval [−1/2,1/2], then conventional
arbitration is more outcome-accurate than ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Here is the intuition behind this result: When agents believe that their opponent
is wrong, they are unlikely to reach any agreement on a settlement payment. Each
of them simply believes that the arbitrator will support his or her claim. In such a
case, the form of arbitration does not much aﬀect their willingness to negotiate an
agreement.
However, ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration allows agents to make “strong” claims against
their opponent and (as they believe) thereby take advantage of their opponent’s being
32wrong. This in turn makes the arbitrator take more extreme decisions, and thereby
reduces the accuracy of arbitration.
The logic behind Proposition 6 is particularly easy to see in the limit case when
there is no noise (￿ ε ≡ 0) in the arbitrator’s decision. If agents have diﬀerent beliefs
about the arbitrator’s decision, Ana expects −c to be the peak of the arbitrator’s
preferences, and Brian expects the peak to be at 1 + c. Thus, if the play reaches
period 2, Ana’s ﬁnal oﬀer never exceeds −c, while Brian’s ﬁnal oﬀer never falls below
1 + c. This in turn implies that Ana’s ﬁnal oﬀer that best responds to Brian’s ﬁnal
oﬀer never exceeds
−c − [(1 + c) − (−c)] = −1 − 3c,
while Brian’s ﬁnal oﬀer that best responds to Ana’s ﬁnal oﬀer never falls below
1 + c + [(1 + c) − (−c)] = 2 + 3c.
Continuing this reasoning, one concludes that the ﬁnal oﬀers will tend to −∞ and
+∞, respectively.
The deadweight-loss is identical under both forms of arbitration since under both
scenarios the parties end up with arbitration if and only if each agent believes that his
or her opponent is mistaken. Note, however, that this result relies on risk neutrality.
If parties were risk-averse, one would like not only to minimize the probability of
ﬁling an arbitration request, but also to minimize the risk included in the arbitrator’s
decision. Since ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration typically exposes the parties to more risk, its
deadweight loss would typically exceed that of conventional arbitration. Again, it is
particularly easy to see in the limit case, in which there is no noise in the arbitrator’s
decision. Then the arbitrator imposes a payment of 1/2 in the conventional arbitration
game, and the arbitrator randomizes between the ﬁnal oﬀers that tend to −∞ and
+∞ in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game.
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5.1 Quality of Arbitration
In discussing the role of the quality of arbitration, a number of earlier papers have
modelled a lower quality as a mean-preserving spread of the noise term ε. The typical
result is that arbitration of lower quality can (paradoxically) result in more eﬃcient
outcomes by encouraging more collective bargaining by risk-averse parties.
The present setting oﬀers two insights. Under noncommon prior beliefs, a lower
quality (modelled as a mean-preserving spread) leads to more accurate outcomes even
for risk-neutral agents in the ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration game. The result is particularly
clear in the limit case, in which there is no uncertainty about the arbitrator’s decision.
Then, as the quality of arbitration becomes almost perfect, the ﬁnal oﬀers tend to
−∞ and +∞, which moves the outcome away from the most accurate one. This
result turns out to be quite general, as it requires only some mild assumptions about
the density function f.
The parameter η can be used as another measure of the quality of arbitration,
under which, it may well happen that arbitration of lower quality results in less eﬃ-
cient outcomes. Consider the conventional arbitration game with attention restricted
to the equilibrium in which type a randomizes between accepting and rejecting and
type b rejects the settlement payment. Then a higher η implies a higher β (see (9)),
i.e., a higher quality of arbitration reduces its deadweight-loss. By construction, a
higher quality of arbitration will typically lead to a higher outcome-accuracy as well.
5.2 Future Research
This paper compares only two forms of arbitration, although they are the two most
common forms. In practice, other forms of arbitration have also been (or are) in use.
In public-service disputes, some states allow parties to choose the form of arbitration:
ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration applies if (and only if) one of the parties refuses conventional
arbitration. In Iowa, an arbitration procedure involves three tiers: mediation, fact-
34ﬁnding with recommendations, and ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration, during which the arbitrator
must choose one of three oﬀers, since the fact ﬁnder’s recommendation is included as
a separate oﬀer. In some proposed schemes (see Crawford (1981)), each party makes
two oﬀers, the arbitrator selects the party who made the better oﬀers (the winner),
and then the other party chooses between the oﬀers made by the winner. More
generally, the question of optimal mechanism design remains to be investigated.15
One may also wish to explore the potential role of other signalling or screening
procedures, combined with or as an alternative to ﬁnal oﬀers, e.g., “burning money” or
the possibility of making another settlement payment oﬀer after ﬁling an arbitration
request but before the arbitrator’s decision. These modiﬁcations lead to a number of
interesting questions, but unfortunately, the models of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration become
intractable after introducing these modiﬁcations.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the present model is “one-dimensional” in
that the conﬂict involves just one issue. In practice, collective bargaining is often
“multi-dimensional” (in that it involves several issues). Two forms of ﬁnal-oﬀer ar-
bitration have been developed for dealing with such multi-dimensional situations. In
package arbitration, parties make a ﬁnal oﬀer, specifying their position on each issue,
and the arbitrator selects one of the oﬀers. In issue-by-issue arbitration, the arbitra-
tor makes a separate decision on each issue. See Crawford (1981) and Lester (1984)
for a survey discussion, and Çelen (2003) for an attempt at formal analysis of the two
forms of ﬁnal-oﬀer arbitration.
6 Appendix A
Proof of Claim 2: Recall that type a is willing to accept a strictly lower settlement
payment than type b. Therefore, the following three responses to the equilibrium oﬀer
of the settlement payment are possible: (a) both types accept with probability 1; (b)
type b accepts with a probability q ∈ (0,1) and type a accepts with probability 1; (c)
type b rejects with probability 1 and type a accepts with a probability q ∈ [0,1].
15Brams and Merrill III (1986) can be viewed as an attempt at addressing this question.
35To prove the claim, I have to eliminate possibility (b). Indeed, if (b) happened
in equilibrium, then the arbitrator would know in period 2 that Brian’s type is b.
The settlement payment in period 1 would, therefore, have to be equal to 1 to make
Brian indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting it. Suppose now that Ana oﬀers
(in period 1) a settlement payment higher by a little ν than the equilibrium oﬀer.
Both types of Brian accept this higher payment. They must do so because otherwise
they would face the arbitrator’s decision in period 2 and the arbitrator at best would
assume that Brian’s type is b; however, the payoﬀ of this decision is equal to 1 for
type b, and is even lower for type a, whose made-up argument can be detected by
the arbitrator. Since oﬀering the slightly higher settlement payment means that Ana
does not have to pay the legal cost and pays even less in expectation (since she does
not have to pay Brian’s legal cost), she strictly prefers oﬀering the higher settlement
payment provided that ν is suﬃciently small.
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose ﬁrst that some sγ yields a higher payoﬀ to Ana
than the settlement payment s actually oﬀered by Ana in an equilibrium (assuming
that the rejection of any sγ results in the arbitrator’s belief that Brian’s type is b
with probability γ). Then the only case in which Ana has an incentive to oﬀer s
will be when the oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀer of sγ does not result in the arbitrator believing
that Brian’s type is b with probability γ, contingent on the rejection of sγ. If the
rejection of any sγ resulted in a higher belief (than γ), then type a would have to
reject the settlement payment of sγ, which in turn implies that the rejection of sγ
could not result in the higher belief. (It would instead result in the arbitrator’s belief
that Brian’s type is b with probability 1/2.) If it resulted in a lower belief, then type
a would have to accept the settlement payment of sγ, and the lower belief would be
possible only if type b accepted it as well. This, however, would make the payoﬀ of
Ana even higher compared to the case in which the rejection of any sγ results in the
arbitrator’s belief that Brian’s type is b with probability γ.
Proof of Claim 4: (a) Observe that the settlement payment oﬀered by Ana
cannot be higher than s1/2. As a result, it is easy to see that an identical equilibrium
36outcome obtains when the settlement payment is equal to s1/2. In this case, both types
of Brian reject all oﬀers of a settlement payment no higher than s1/2, but respond to
the oﬀers higher than s1/2 as in the original equilibrium.
(b) If type a strictly preferred to accept a positive settlement payment, then
Ana would strictly prefer to oﬀer a settlement payment lower by a little ν than the
equilibrium oﬀer. By accepting such a payment, type a would obtain a higher payoﬀ
than she would if she had to face the arbitrator’s decision in period 2 contingent on
the event that Brian’s type is b, because then she would have to pay the legal cost. It
would therefore be accepted by type a, which would make the payoﬀ of Ana strictly
higher, contingent on type b rejecting this oﬀer. It could happen that the alternative
settlement payment gets accepted by type b, but this would make the payoﬀ of Ana
even higher.
To demonstrate the very last assertion, notice that if 0 < s1/2 and type b rejects
the settlement payment of 0, then type a strictly prefers to reject this payment. If
s1/2 ≤ 0 ≤ s1, then the settlement payment of 0 can be oﬀered in equilibrium only
when type a is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting this payment.
Proof of Lemma 1: By deﬁnition,
dtβ
dβ
=
d
￿
(1 − η)πAF β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ (1 − η)πB
￿
1 − F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
dβ
=
∂
￿
(1 − η)πAF β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ (1 − η)πB
￿
1 − F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
∂πA
·
dπA
dβ
+
∂
￿
(1 − η)πAF β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ (1 − η)πB
￿
1 − F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
∂πB
·
dπB
dβ
+
∂
￿
(1 − η)πAF β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
+ (1 − η)πB
￿
1 − F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
∂β
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side equals 0 due to the ﬁrst-order condition (10).
37The second term equals
(1 − η)
￿
πA − πB
2
f
β(
πA + πB
2
) +
￿
1 − F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿￿
dπB
dβ
= (1 − η)
￿
1 − 2F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿
dπB
dβ
,
again due to the ﬁrst-order condition (10). Finally, one can be compute directly that
the third term equals
(1 − η)(1 + 2c)(πB − πA)f
β(
πA + πB
2
) = (1 − η)(1 + 2c)2F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
,
again due to the ﬁrst-order condition (10). It follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions
(10) and (11) that
dπB
dβ
< (1 + 2c)
and
F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
≤
1
2
,
and the latter inequality is strict unless β = 1/2. This can be easily seen in Figure
2: If β ≥ 1/2, the curve
πB − πA
2
= 1−F 1/2
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
/f1/2(
πA + πB
2
) is obtained
by moving the curve
πB − πA
2
= 1 − F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
/fβ(
πA + πB
2
) to the left. So
the intersection of
πB − πA
2
= 1 − F1/2
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
/f1/2(
πA + πB
2
) and
πB − πA
2
=
F β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
/fβ(
πA + πB
2
) is at
πA + πB
2
≤
1
2
, as the intersection of the latter
curve with the curve
πB − πA
2
= 1 − Fβ
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
/fβ(
πA + πB
2
) is at
πA + πB
2
=
1
2
.
Thus, for any β ≥ 1/2,
dtβ
dβ
≤ (1 − η)(1 + 2c)
￿
1 − 2F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿￿
+ (1 − η)(1 + 2c)2F
β
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
= (1 − η)(1 + 2c) =
dsβ
dβ
by (8). The inequality is strict when β > 1/2, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 2: By calculations, the marginal cost given by (16) can be
expressed as
1
2
￿
f
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿￿
πA − πB,a
2
￿
+ F
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿￿
+
1
2
￿
f
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿￿
πA − πB,b
2
￿
+ F
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿￿
,
and further, by the ﬁrst-order conditions (13) and (14), as
F
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
+ F
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
− 1. (21)
Combining (13)-(15), I obtain that:
2(1 − β)F
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
+ 2βF
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
− 1 = 0, (22)
and so (21) equals 0 for β = 1/2. It follows from (13) and (14) that
F
0
￿
πA + πB,a
2
￿
> F
1
￿
πA + πB,b
2
￿
,
and so it follows from (22) that for β > 1/2, (21) must be greater than 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: It follows from the deﬁnitions of fB, FB, fA, F A, and
(19) and (20) that
πA + πB
2
=
1
2
.
Indeed, since f is symmetric and unimodal around 0, fA and fB are symmetric and
unimodal around −c and 1 + c, respectively. As a result, I obtain that:
f
A(
πA + πB
2
) < f
B(
πA + πB
2
) and 1 − F
B
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
< F
A
￿
πA + πB
2
￿
if
πA + πB
2
> 1
2, and so the right-hand side of (19) exceeds the right-hand side of
(20). Conversely, the right-hand side of (20) exceeds the right-hand side of (19) if
πA + πB
2
< 1
2.
39The assumption that fB is symmetric and unimodal around 1+c also implies that
f
B(
1
2
) ≤
1
1 + 2c
.
Otherwise, fB would exceed 1/(1 + 2c) on the interval
￿
1
2, 3
2 + 2c
￿
whose length is
equal to 1 + 2c.
Since ￿ 1+c
1/2
f
B >
￿
1
2
+ c
￿
· f
B(
1
2
),
F
B
￿
1
2
￿
<
1
2
−
￿
1
2
+ c
￿
· f
B(
1
2
).
Thus, by (20),
πB − πA
2
>
1 −
￿
1
2 −
￿
1
2 + c
￿
· fB(
1
2
)
￿
fB(
1
2
)
=
=
1
2
fB(
1
2
)
+
￿
1
2
+ c
￿
≥
1
2
1
1+2c
+
￿
1
2
+ c
￿
= 1 + 2c.
Since
πA + πB
2
= 1
2,
πA < −
1
2
− 2c and πB >
3
2
+ 2c. (23)
Now, I conclude that
￿ 1
0
l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f
1/2(x)dx =
￿ 1/2
0
l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f
1/2(x)dx +
￿ 1
1/2
l(|−x − c + 1|,|x − c − 1|)f
1/2(x)dx
<
1
2
l(1 − c,1 + c) +
1
2
l
￿
max
￿
1
2
− c,c
￿
,
1
2
+ c
￿
<
1
2
l(|−πA − c + 1|,|πA − c − 1|) +
1
2
l(|−πB − c + 1|,|πB − c − 1|).
40The ﬁrst inequality follows from c < 1
2 and the assumption that the loss function l
is increasing in both variables, while the second inequality follows from (23) and the
assumption that the loss function l is increasing in both variables.
Similarly,
￿ 1
0
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx =
￿ 1/2
0
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx +
￿ 1
1/2
l(|−x − c|,|x − c|)f
1/2(x)dx
<
1
2
l
￿
1
2
+ c,max
￿
c,
1
2
− c
￿￿
+
1
2
l(1 + c,1 − c)
<
1
2
l(|−πA − c|,|πA − c|) +
1
2
l(|−πB − c|,|πB − c|).
This completes the proof due to the assumption that f is up to a small enough δ in
the interval [−1/2,1/2].
7 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: The arguments are standard, so I will only sketch them
here. I shall ﬁrst show that there exists an equilibrium of the continuation game be-
ginning in period 2 under an additional exogenous constraint on ﬁnal oﬀers. Suppose
that the ﬁnal oﬀers have to be chosen from a ﬁnite grid of the interval [−C,1 + C]:
πA,πB ∈
￿
−C +
k
n
(1 + 2C) : k = 0,...,n
￿
(24)
for some n = 1,2,.... Under this additional assumption, the existence of equilibria
follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. Indeed, one can simply take a ﬁxed point
of the correspondence whose domain (and range) consist of the mixed actions πA of
Ana, the mixed actions of each type of Brian (denoted by πB,a and πB,b, respectively),
and the arbitrator’s beliefs contingent on each oﬀer from the grid. The correspondence
assigns to every triple πA, πB,a, πB,b, and to the arbitrator’s beliefs, the actions that
are best responses to the opponent’s action(s) and to the arbitrator’s optimal decision
given the beliefs; the correspondence also assigns the beliefs determined by the Bayes
41rule to any oﬀer that is used with positive probability, and the set of all possible
beliefs to any oﬀer that is used with probability 0.
I shall now show that condition (24) is dispensable. This relies on the following
“limit” argument. For any given n, the equilibrium mixed actions πn
A, πn
B,a and πn
B,b
are probability (Borel) measures on [−C,1+C]. The space of all (Borel) probability
measures is metrizable and compact in the weak*-topology. One can therefore assume
(passing to a subsequence if necessary) that these mixed actions converge (in the
weak*-topology) as n goes to ∞ to some measures πA, πB,a, and πB,b. For details,
see the Riesz Theorem (Dudley 1989, Theorem 7.4.1), the Banach-Alaoglu Theorem
(Rudin 1973, Theorem 3.15) and Rudin 1973, Theorem 3.16.
By Dudley (1989), Theorem 10.2.2, πB,a and πB,b determine conditional probabil-
ities µ(a | π) and µ(b | π) with µ(a | π) + µ(b | π) = 1, unique up to a set of ﬁnal
oﬀers π that are used with probability 0 by both πB,a and πB,b. The convergence of
(πn
B,a,πn
B,b) to (πB,a,πB,b) implies that for almost every π (i.e., except a set of ﬁnal
oﬀers π that are used with probability 0 by both πB,a and πB,b) and every ε > 0,
there exists a δ > 0 such that if: (i) n is large enough, (ii)
￿ ￿π/ − π
￿ ￿ < δ, and (iii) π/
is of the form (24), then µn(a | π/) and µn(b | π/) diﬀer by at most ε from µ(a | π)
and µ(b | π), respectively. One can now easily verify that πA, πB,a and πB,b together
with µ(a | π) and µ(b | π) (say, µ(a | π) := 1 and µ(b | π) := 0 for ﬁnal oﬀers π
that are used with probability 0 by Brian) is an equilibrium of the continuation game
beginning in period 2.
Thus, for every value β of the probability that Brian is of type b, the contin-
uation game beginning in period 2 has an equilibrium. It is easy to see that the
correspondence which assigns to every β the set of equilibrium strategies πA, πB,a,
and πB,b is upper hemi-continuous (assuming, of course, that the space of strategies
πA, πB,a, and πB,b is equipped with the weak*-topology). This in turn implies that
the correspondence which assigns to every β the set of equilibrium payoﬀ vectors in
the continuation game beginning in period 2 is also upper hemi-continuous.
Thus, there also exists a triple β, Eβ, and tβ which maximizes Ana’s payoﬀ (in
the two-stage game) over all triples β, Eβ, and tβ consisting of a belief β ≥ 1/2, an
42equilibrium Eβ of the continuation game beginning in period 2 given this belief β, and
a settlement payment tβ which makes type a of Brian indiﬀerent between accepting
tβ and ﬁling an request for arbitration (anticipating Eβ). Denote by β
∗ the β at
which the maximum is reached, and by u this maximum payoﬀ of Ana. Now, take
any equilibrium for β = 1 (say, E1), and consider the minimum settlement payment
that makes type b of Brian indiﬀerent between accepting the payment and ﬁling a
request for arbitration (anticipating E1). Denote this settlement payment by v.
If u ≥ −v, then the two-stage game has an equilibrium in which Ana oﬀers the
settlement payment tβ∗. This payment is accepted by type a of Brian with the prob-
ability q given by (6) from Section 3 for γ = β
∗, and is rejected with probability
1 by type b of Brian. Agents anticipate the equilibrium Eβ∗ contingent on the re-
jection of this settlement payment. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, agents anticipate any
Eβ contingent on the rejection of the settlement payment tβ for any other β ￿= β
∗;
furthermore, tβ is accepted by type a of Brian with the probability q given by (6)
for γ = β, and is rejected with probability 1 by type b of Brian. Agents anticipate
E1 contingent on the rejection of any settlement payment higher than all tβ; any of
these settlement payments is accepted with probability 1 by type a, and accepted or
rejected with probability 1 by type b, depending on whether this type prefers this
settlement payment or the payoﬀ in the two-stage game contingent on ﬁling a request
for arbitration (anticipating that E1will be played in period 2). Finally, agents antic-
ipate E1/2 contingent on the rejection of any settlement payment lower than all tβ,
and both types of Brian reject these payments with probability 1.
If u ≤ −v, then the two-stage game has an equilibrium in which Ana oﬀers
the settlement payment v. This payment is accepted by both types of Brian with
probability 1. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, the play is deﬁned in the same way as for
u ≥ −v.
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